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Preparing for “Peak Oil”:
Towards a Preliminary Agenda
Ken Piddington
In summary, the problem of the peaking of
conventional world oil production is unlike any
yet faced by modern industrial society.
The challenges and uncertainties need to be much
better understood.  Technologies exist to mitigate
the problem. Timely, aggressive risk management
will be essential.
This quotation is from the executive summary of a
major report issued in February 2005 on the peaking
of world oil production.   That in itself is unremarkable,
but the document – which has come to be known as
“The Hirsch Report” – was sponsored by the United
States Department of Energy (DOE).  There are all
the usual disclaimers about the policy of the United
States Government.  Nevertheless, as early as 2003,
DOE clearly decided that a sound technical analysis
of the issues raised by the approach of “Peak Oil” was
a job which would be worth the investment of time
and money.
As a “summary of the summary”, these few sentences
can serve as a wake-up call for New Zealand.  They state
very crisply the policy challenge which the world is facing
in the first half of this century (or, as many would argue,
in its first quarter...). They also remind us that in a
situation of uncertainty, protracted debate about when
the event might actually occur may not be particularly
helpful.  Instead, we can use the discipline of risk
assessment to learn more about where uncertainty lies.
For the policy community on both sides of the Tasman,
the task which is now becoming urgent is the
formulation of a transitional strategy.  For this country,
and for Australia, such a strategy should respond to the
call by the authors of the Hirsch Report for “aggressive
risk management”. The following notes suggest some
areas which might serve as a starting point. They may
also stimulate thinking about the wider agenda which
would need to be covered in any agreed strategy.
Terminology: The term “Peak Oil” has been in use by
industry experts for some fifty years. It is understood in
the technical literature as describing the point at which
global potential to extract additional supplies of oil levels off
and becomes permanently outpaced by the growth in world
demand. The profile of historic peaking has been
documented in fine detail for individual oilfields and for
the total resources of particular countries. The application
of the concept to the overall world supply has however
raised a range of issues, including the high unreliability
of the statistical base.
Only in the last year or so has the term moved outside
industry, academic and NGO circles, into more general
journalistic and popular usage. In the process, it has
rapidly become confused with the notion of a “peaking”
in oil prices. This leaves an implication that after “Peak
Oil” prices could return to a more normal level, which
is a fallacy. Although fluctuations will continue, the
irreversible trend will be (and possibly is already) towards
higher prices.  For this reason, many have argued that
the term “Post-Cheap Oil” should be used to describe
the period we are about to enter.
Global Repercussions: Some of the fundamental
implications have already become apparent, particularly
since the 2003 invasion of Iraq (which many
commentators described as an “Oil War”). Large
importers, such as the United States and Japan, will face
major escalation of costs and will also be vulnerable to
interruptions in supply (either for economic or political
motives).  Rapidly-growing economies, especially China
and India, may find their expansion suddenly checked
unless they too can negotiate arrangements which
guarantee security of supply. Against this scenario, the
“Oil Shocks” of the 1970s will appear in retrospect as a
minor perturbation.
The Economic Illusion: Laws of supply and demand
would suggest that as the price goes up, there will be a
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supply response and that markets will simply stabilise at a
higher level. Already, governments around the world are
facing pressure, particularly from transport lobbies, to
reduce the (generally) high level of taxation on oil-based
fuels (and to subsidize “extenders” such as ethanol) so that
commercial operations can avoid having to pass increased
fuel costs on to other sectors of the economy.  (The airlines’
fuel surcharge seems to act as a parallel device, intended to
make the impact of higher fuel prices transparent, and
therefore more acceptable, to the consumer).
The Geological Reality: Since hydrocarbon deposits
below the earth’s surface are by any real-world definition
non-renewable, it follows that “Peak Oil” actually
presages a tapering off in the flow of oil supplies. This
decline is for all practical purposes irreversible.  (This is
not to say that oil will “run out”, but that volumes will
drop to what will become a relative “trickle”). Higher
prices will not trigger a surge in new supplies, neither
will they encourage the adoption of new technology to
discover and develop previously unknown or inaccessible
deposits. All that will have happened before the Peak
Oil event.
The Petrochemical Prop: Analysts have pointed out that
it is not just oil, gas and liquid fuels which are implicated.
We have only to think of plastics to realize that an
impressive variety of oil-derived compounds is now in
common use worldwide. These materials have over the
past century made a huge contribution to economic
development.  Even with extensive recycling, many
essential components of industrialization will increase
in price and some may become unobtainable. Work on
substitution will therefore not be limited to alternative
fuels. All countries will find it necessary to invest in
research and development on new products which are
of particular importance to them.
Where to start? There are isolated aspects of public
policy where the need to consider the implications of
Peak Oil has already become apparent. How should
investment in roading capacity be weighed against
improvements in public transport? If all fossil fuels,
including coal, are going to become significantly more
expensive, what are the implications for future
investment in electricity generation? And distribution?
Are the twentieth-century templates for urban (and
particularly suburban) design and servicing at all relevant
to the situation which will develop in the twenty-first
century? These examples are certainly serving to raise
awareness and to stimulate new thinking. They could
well extend incrementally to cover all major sectors of
the economy in a relatively short space of time, including
tourism (where patterns will surely change), land-use
(where measures of energy inputs and outputs will
become crucially important), and so on. But even if
well co-ordinated, such a collective effort would not
necessarily deliver an adequate strategy.
Transition is a Core Concept: The strategic principle
for New Zealand, as for all other countries, must be to
link the end of cheap oil with a transition to a new mix
of new, and mainly renewable, sources of energy. For
this transition to succeed, one can prescribe also a
quantum shift in energy efficiency – again, new
technologies are constantly emerging which will
accelerate such a shift, but effective policy instruments
are still lacking. Ideally, the transition could be designed
around the need to define where in future the country’s
comparative advantage will lie, relative to our major
trading partners. Because of the growing integration of
the two economies, it would be prudent to develop the
transitional strategy in close co-ordination with
Australia, and to pool resources in the many areas, such
as forestry, where both countries will be affected in a
similar way.
When to start? If the focus is on the inevitable transition,
it becomes clear that preparation is more important than
prediction. Enough evidence is to hand for us to
understand that transition will be time-consuming and
also costly, so the time to start is now. Leading analysts
in the United States have pointed to the lengthy time
horizon for the replacement of capital stock, and to the
need to identify early opportunities for mitigation - all
of which suggests that the scenario technique (as referred
to above) should be a useful tool. It would certainly get
some transitional options on the table in short order
and assist future governments to enlist stakeholder
support in what must be a community-wide effort.
In conclusion, we might ask; where does the duty to
initiate lie? Most would agree that this is a task for
Government. It alone has the authority and the resources
to trigger effort on the scale that is needed. New Zealand
has been able to bring together its response to external
threats on previous occasions, such as Britain’s entry into
Europe and the loss of our protected status in the “Old
Country” (which required a major diversification of
export markets within less than a decade). Invariably, at
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these times, political leaders find they must be
unambiguous about the urgency of the task and seek out
a consensus in Parliament to that effect. They must also
keep the public fully informed. The sequence for such a
political “kick-off” might be as follows;
• Identification of strategic objectives – through
publication of a white or “green” paper, followed by
the option of Parliamentary process (via Select
Committee) or an independent sequence of enquiry
and consultation (full-time Task Force or similar);
• Creation and resourcing of mechanisms to construct
and model scenarios in support of the enquiry.  These
groups would need to be retained over the medium
term to pursue any programme of research identified
during the initial enquiry;
• Engagement of all levels of government (local,
regional, central and possibly trans-Tasman) to
identify actions and allocate responsibility for
performance of each task;
• Electronic networks to support all of the above
processes and to enlist the ongoing involvement of all
stakeholders, community groups, media and so on.
As stated above, prediction of this phenomenon cannot
– and need not – be precise; “Peak Oil” by its nature is
a “rear-mirror occurrence” – we will only know when it
has happened after the event. Even the above sketch of
what is a highly complex phenomenon serves to bring
out the size of the task confronting policymakers.
Sophisticated modelling may serve to refine the range
of scenarios, and assess levels of probability, but none
will earn universal endorsement. As with climate change,
governments will need therefore to switch to risk
management mode and concentrate on precautionary
policies – covering social, environmental and
institutional responses as well as strategic approaches to
economic adjustment. It will be a big job.
These notes have been sub-titled “Towards a preliminary
agenda”... There is however no way in which this process
can be initiated with a pre-determined agenda, action
plan or similar matrix. The enquiry itself will bring many
hidden issues to light, and may also refine a framework
within which the transitional strategy itself can be
formulated and implemented. There could be no greater
test of our self-image as an innovative society. The
openness and accessibility of the process to all groups
will ultimately deliver its success.
In the final analysis, action on Peak Oil is not pre-
eminently a technical agenda nor is it primarily a
political agenda.  It is both of these, as well as being
environmental, social and economic - to the extent that
it is an all-of-society - and ultimately a global - agenda.
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Further reading
The Hirsch Report (91pp) can be downloaded in pdf.
format from www.hilltoplancers.org/stories/hirsch
0502.pdf and a large number of commentaries are
available from the website of the US Department of
Energy at www.USDOE.net.  One of these is from the
Association for the Study of Peak Oil and Gas, which
has for many years been the principal focus for study of
the phenomenon – its website is constantly updated at
www.peakoil.com
Recent press articles – see for example “The Guardian
Weekly” (Vol.172 No.19, April 29 - May 5 2005) have
highlighted the proceedings of a major Conference held
in Edinburgh on 25 April 2005. The title of the event
was   “Peak Oil UK: Entering the Age of Oil Depletion”
and included presentations from leading experts in the
field.  These are accessible at: www.odacinfo.org
PeakOilUKConferenceProceedings.htm and offer
collectively the best introduction to the topic.
